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Abstract
Islamic banks have tendency to tinker the earnings to present positive income. Therefore, it requires the 
examination of the relationship between Real Earnings Management (REM) and Accrual-based Earnings 
Management (AEM) that have contribution in promoting earnings. There are 2 theories used including 
prospect theory is to explain the negative relationship between REM and AEM, and agency theory is 
to explain whether the variables can be costs of REM or AEM. There are 63 financial reports of Islamic 
banks during the 2013-2018 period are determined by using purposive sampling and gathered from the 
banks’ website. Correlation and regression test were conducted. This study found that REM is done 
through generating operational revenue and reducing distributed revenue sharing beyond the normal 
activities. REM negatively affects AEM that managers will adjust AEM based on the results of REM 
during the financial period. These findings confirm the prospect theory when the realized income is less 
than profit expectation, managers will employ accrual manipulation with the motive of prospect theory 
to achieve income target. Market share is found as a cost of AEM and institutional shows different result 
which drives REM more. The implication of this study is to provide findings how Islamic banks engage 
in earnings management. The relationship between REM and AEM shows the reliability of earnings that 
needs concern to restrict.
Keywords: Accrual-Based Earnings Management (AEM); Real Earnings Management (REM); Variables 
Costs
INTRODUCTION
Management engagement in earnings management can be due to several reasons. It arises from debt 
contract, political reason, or conflicting of interest between managers and principal. Managers commonly 
have personal reason to achieve bonus by manipulating earnings, both through Real Earnings Management 
(REM) through real activities and Accrual-based Earnings Management (AEM) (Shen & Chih, 2005). In 
bank context, REM is applied by accelerating the loan, managing the interest expense paid and (or) 
postponing discretionary expenses to jack up profits (Roychowdhury, 2006; Surifah, 2014). Meanwhile, 
AEM is done by selecting accounting policies which affects income and expenses in income statement and 
cash in/out in statement of cash flows (Scott, 2012).
However, there are other reasons why management implement earnings management, especially 
Islamic banks which have different characteristics from conventional banks. Business financed by the 
Islamic banks that have high uncertainty and banks have to bear additional risks due to the margin and 
profit loss sharing contracts (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012). Besides, Islamic banks are still new compared to 
conventional banks. Islamic banks attempt to fulfill industry expectations, especially to preserve depositors’ 
trust (Shen & Chih, 2005). To maintain depositors’ trust and to attract new depositors, Islamic banks 
manage the earnings to present positive income or achieve the income threshold (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012).
Efforts to meet income benchmark is very important because earnings are the key concerned by 
stakeholders. Managing earnings might enhance the reputation for stakeholders (Graham et al., 2005) 
especially depositors. Management’s action is to attain current year income and give a signal to have better 
performance in the next period (Gunny, 2010). It can be observed that mostly earnings of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia always meet the prior year’s earnings. These facts indicate that the fundamental characteristics 
of Islamic financial institution do not restrict managers to manage earnings. Islamic banks are not much 
different from conventional in cultivating profit although Islamic banks have less practices of earnings 
management than non-Islamic banks (Quttainah et al., 2011).
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Many existing studies have examined that Islamic banks do earnings management by accrual 
adjustments or accounting practice artificially as mentioned by Saringat et al. (2013) for instance 
by avoiding loss and eluding earnings decrease (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012), using abnormal loan loss 
provisions (Quttainah et al., 2011), or smoothing the income (Saringat et al., 2013). Other study 
found that earning management in Islamic banks is also conducted by real activities (Surifah, 2014). 
However, prior studies examined REM and AEM in Islamic banks separately. It is needed to examine 
the relationship of both strategies of earnings management simultaneously in this study.
Investigation of management’s preferences between REM and AEM become a concern in recent 
research (Vladu, 2015). Several studies present findings how REM and AEM strategies correlate in 
firms (Zang, 2012; Jafarpour & Soumehsaraei, 2013). Zang (2012) found there was a trade-off between 
2 methods. Some studies provide the same evidence but in specific context such as in seasoned 
equity offerings as a cost constraining accrual and encouraging real manipulation (Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010; Kothari et al., 2016), tighter accounting standards that significantly increase REM (Ewert & 
Wagenhofer, 2005), duration of firm overvaluation (Badertscher, 2011), in the Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) year (Chung et al., 2012) or Sarbanes-Oxley periods (Cohen et al., 2008; Ibrahim et al., 2011).
Contrary to Zang (2012), Jafarpour & Soumehsaraei (2013) found that management conduct REM 
and AEM complementary each other.  Due to the different findings of the correlation between REM 
and AEM, it is important to establish additional study in testing how these 2 earnings managements 
correlate in Islamic banks. The examination of the correlation between REM and AEM at the same 
time can show the overall impact of earnings management activities and how managers utilize these 
2 strategies with different costs and timing. Besides, REM and AEM in Islamic banks are slightly 
different. Related to REM, revenue of Islamic banks origins from Islamic-based contracts, such as 
murabaha, istishna, salam, ijarah, mudharabah, or musharaka; and interest expense in conventional 
banks is replaced by revenue sharing to third parties as the Islamic banks do not give interest to 
depositors, but in the form of revenue sharing (Surifah, 2017).
This study fills the gap and makes contributions in several ways.  Firstly, this study is an initial 
study to examine the relationship between REM and AEM in Islamic banks context. It focuses on 
both techniques at a time because prior studies examine only one type of earnings management 
(Quttainah et al., 2011; Saringat et al., 2013; Surifah, 2014). Secondly, it also improves the one part 
of the formula to calculate REM which is measured by revenue sharing distributed. Revenue sharing 
distributed is one of specific variable for Islamic bank context, which is different with interest expense 
paid to conventional bank customers. To reflect the real manipulation, the amount of revenue sharing 
should be in cash. The reason could be revenue sharing to third parties is an expense that can be 
managed. It can be different with the revenue sharing paid in cash. Similar to abnormal cash flows 
that be regressed with accrual operating revenue, the sharing distribution should be in cash that will 
be regressed with accrual operating revenue. It supports a statement that states abnormal cash flows 
is a sign of earnings management (Srivastava, 2019). Therefore, the revenue sharing distributed in 
income loss statement should be deducted by unpaid revenue sharing. Thirdly, it attempts to explain 
the relationship between REM and AEM using prospect theory. Prospect theory has been used to 
explain earnings management (Koonce & Mercer, 2005; Pududu & Villiers, 2016), but the real and 
accrual methods has not been discussed at the same time. Therefore, this study aims to test the 
correlation between REM and AEM in Islamic banks whether there is a trade-off or complimentary 
association.
This study also examines the relative costs effects on REM and AEM whether to encourage or 
limit REM or AEM using agency theory.  When the relative costs limit 1 technique, the banks will 
engage more in other techniques. Some studies have found that there are relative costs that affect the 
selection between REM and AEM (Zang, 2012; Joosten, 2012). This study does not test on a specific 
event due to recently evolving of Islamic banks in Indonesia in the last 10 years. This study aims to 
optimize the results, so that it uses all annually Islamic banks’ financial statements available from 2013 
to 2018. Actually, there are several banks founded in 2011, but financial statements of 2011 were used 
to give data t-2 for samples of 2013.
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory defines several postulates. Certainty effect is related to choices to take or avoid 
risks based on certainty of gains or losses. The theory explains that the individual decision is based on 
risks and prospects. The risks will be avoided if there is a certainty of returns. When the realized income 
has been over the expectation, hence individual will be a risk averter (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Otherwise, if there is a certain loss, so individual will be a risk taker to gain income (Shen & Chih, 2005).
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Prospect theory then start to be used to explain the incentives of and to predict earnings 
management behavior (Shen & Chih, 2005; Li & Hwang, 2017; Subekti, 2012). When corporates 
encounter gain or loss in capital market, corporate management will take actions in responding 
the gain or loss by engaging in earnings management to increase income (Li & Hwang, 2017). The 
individual will derive the maximum value on the loss (not profit). The condition of small loss or 
negative earnings will motivate managers to perform earnings management to change negative 
earnings to positive earnings (Subekti, 2012).
Despite effort to change from negative to positive earnings, managers might have income target 
as a reference point. If the realized income is below the target, individual will take opportunities 
to increase the income (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Fiegenbaum, 1990; Bowman, 1980). In short, 
managers focus on achieving earnings target as the theory states that determination of an outcome to 
be classified as gains or losses is based on a flexible reference point (Pududu & Villiers, 2016).
This threshold point can be adjusted based on investors’, creditors’, or analysts’ expectations 
as basis to evaluate firms’ performance (Koonce & Mercer, 2005; Degeorge et al., 1999). Reference 
point can be zero, earnings in prior year or analysts’ forecast (Degeorge et al., 1999). The reference 
point can push firms to either avoid small losses, take big baths, create a reserve, or consider investors’ 
point of reference. That is why prospect theory explains the reason of managers to avoid reporting 
losses (Koonce & Mercer, 2005). After reference point is decided, then decision maker specifies that 
earnings is more than reference point (Koonce & Mercer, 2005).
After all, individual likes to maintain health, so that it determines the threshold as minimum 
wealth to achieve (Pududu & Villiers, 2016). Therefore, prospect theory is used to explain the 
relationship between REM and AEM whereas management uses AEM and REM to maintain the 
wealth or income target. Referring to Subekti (2012), the negative earnings from REM will motivate 
managers to perform AEM with many reasons, such as to change from negative to positive income or 
to achieve particular income target.
Agency Theory
Agency theory begins with an agency relationship between manager as an agent and 
shareholders as principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). There is a separation between shareholders 
and management that manager should ideally act on behalf of shareholders. This separation could 
lead to problems or not based on 2 views from stewardship or agency theory (Bjurman & Weuhagen, 
2013). If the management act as steward, action will be executed in accordance with the shareholders’ 
sake. This behavior does not lead to problems because managers satisfy the shareholders as stated by 
stewardship theory.
Otherwise, the problems arise when managers have self-interest and neglect the shareholders’ 
will. Managers act for their own sake and motives, not for shareholders’ interests which is then 
explained by agency theory (Tanjung et al., 2015; Kazemian & Sanusi, 2015). There is one form 
of the agency conflict is by doing earnings management to window dress the financial statements 
(Hermiyetti & Manik, 2012). The motives of earnings management could be the achievement of 
income target to smooth the income.
Agency theory suggests that monitoring mechanisms are required to align the shareholders 
and management interest. The possible mechanisms are board, ownership structure, and financial 
capability such as capital (Kazemian & Sanusi, 2015) to restrict earnings management. The explanation 
on how these 3 mechanisms limiting of which earnings management between REM or AEM is 
explained below in the hypothesis development section.
Earnings Management
The main drivers of earnings management are capital market incentives, contract incentives 
and regulatory incentives.  Firms face capital market incentives in several settings such as beating 
threshold, issuing stocks, mergers, or insider trading (Eisele, 2012). This study focuses on earnings 
management to beat benchmarks through 2 methods of earnings management, real, and accrual.
AEM is related to choose accounting methods and estimates. The difference of AEM from 
REM is accrual judgement doesn’t have a direct impact on cash flow. AEM covers determining 
depreciation and impairment method for property, plant, and equipment; allowance for loan losses/
doubtful, inventory capitalization cost and allowances; fair value and impairment consideration for the 
financial instrument (Eisele, 2012; Zang, 2012). AEM also involves the choosing of time in applying 
accounting principles (Stolowy & Breton, 2000).
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Meanwhile, REM is manipulation of managers’ real action that deviates from normal practice 
(Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). It modifies the structuring of operation, investment, or financing activities 
and timing of those activities only to affect earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 
2005).  It is hard to be detected and not being concerned by auditors, regulators, and investor; 
whereas real manipulations have severe impacts on cash flow and future performance (Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016). Real action involved makes it more costly and difficult to be 
restricted than AEM (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005).
In order to upward earnings, the company can engage in REM by accelerating sales with high 
discounts, changing the schedule of goods delivery, and postponing or reducing expenditures for 
instance research and development, training, and maintenance (Roychowdhury, 2006).  Otherwise, if 
the company is willing to delay earnings, so actions not cutting sales price and accelerating costs might 
be chosen (Degeorge et al., 1999).
In banking context, the most popular method is using accrual loan loss provisions (Agarwal, 
2007). However, real manipulation could also be done by banks through managing the revenue or 
expense. Related to revenue, management conduct the real action indicated by abnormal cash flows 
which is different from the normal activities (Surifah, 2017; Chou & Chan, 2018), using commission 
and fee income taken by financial institution from account charges to customers and managing other 
kinds of charges fees. Commission and fee income can be jacked up or detained by increasing or 
decreasing the numbers of loan and other banks products (Ozili & Outa, 2019; Ozili, 2017; Agarwal, 
2007). Related to expense, bank can arrange the interest expense based on management decision and 
accelerate or postpone discretionary expenses (research and development, advertising general and 
administration expenses, replacement cost of production assets, and allowance for doubtful accounts) 
to maintain the income target (Surifah, 2017; Chou & Chan, 2018).
Other methods can be in the form of executing or postponing sale of securities to record 
realized gain or loss (Beatty et al., 2002; Barth et al., 2017; Agarwal, 2007). In Islamic banks context, 
there are adjustments of accounts and banks products from conventional banks, such as structuring 
the operation income from Islamic products, managing revenue sharing distribution as a replacement 
for interest expense, and fiddling discretionary expenses (Surifah, 2014).
Previous Studies
There are 2 patterns of earnings management found in previous studies. The first finding is REM 
and AEM are the trade-off as substitutes. The higher (lower) cost of AEM will decrease (increase) 
AEM and increase (decrease) REM. Otherwise, the higher (lower) cost of REM will decrease (increase) 
REM and increase (decrease) AEM (Zang, 2012; Joosten, 2012).
The choice between REM and AEM depends on relative costs. An action to determine 
which type of earnings management can be based on the amount of the relative cost (Zang, 2012). 
Badertscher (2011) stated that firms with financial distress and high possibility of bankrupt are less in 
doing in REM.  Zang (2012) found that market share and financial health negatively affect AEM, and 
institutional ownership positively affects AEM.
The second finding is REM and AEM are complementary. Jafarpour & Soumehsaraei (2013) 
found that REM and AEM are used simultaneously to smooth income. The 2 strategies can be used 
to achieve one objective which is income target. One of the findings is management manage both 
abnormal cash flow from operation as real manipulation and discretionary accruals as accrual upward 
(Vladu, 2015).
Hypothesis Development
The relation between 2 methods of earnings management is hypothetically negative as the 
negative relation between return achieved and risk preference of the managers explained by prospect 
theory. Stolowy & Breton (2000) stated that earnings management is applied to influence market 
perception related to the risk of the firms, consists of risk associated with variance of return through 
earning per share and risk associated with financial structure through debt to equity ratio. Market 
perceive risk is related to unstable or unexpected low earnings. Therefore, when income has failed to 
attain the target, managers are assumed to be risk taker by applying AEM.
AEM will direct market perception and result in higher risk as indicated by reporting lower 
reliability of earnings. In other words, it is riskier to solely engage in AEM. If the income is far below 
the threshold and all strategies of accrual have been used, there will be no option available to push 
additional income (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010).
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Although Jafarpour & Soumehsaraei (2013) found the different results which real manipulation 
positively affects AEM, the hypothesis developed is that accrual is negatively correlated with REM 
(Zang, 2012; Joosten, 2012). REM and AEM have different timing. Real manipulation (REM) is 
conducted during the period as it is impossible to be executed at the end of the year. AEM is the next 
step after realizing REM which is done at the end of the year. REM is applied during the operating of 
the banks and before the year end. Otherwise, AEM is implemented after the completion of activities 
during a year, but before the announcement of financial statements. Managers are found adjusting 
the level of AEM according to REM (Zang, 2012). If REM results are unexpectedly high (low), the 
managers will decrease (increase) the level of AEM. Managers will adjust the income from real 
operation through AEM (Zang, 2012; Joosten, 2012).
Farook et al. (2014) also found overall results that REM indicated by profit distribution (sharing) 
has an inverse relationship with AEM measured by loan loss provision. These incentives may be 
caused by the inability of banks to use real choices to smooth earnings. Managers will use accrual to 
cover the shortcomings to achieve the income target. It is aligned with prospect theory explanation 
that managers focus on earnings target (Koonce & Mercer, 2005). The negative relationship between 
real and accrual means that managers avoid to report too large earnings, but only achieve sufficient 
gains from reference point. Therefore, the hypothesis developed is as follows:
H1: Real earnings management negatively affects accrual earnings management.
Employing earnings management needs cost, whereas AEM is less costly than REM. Based on 
substitution hypothesis between REM and AEM, when the cost of REM increases, for example in 
accelerating sales/loans, it signifies that low REM and management will use more AEM to achieve 
income target. The mechanism of variables as costs that limit earnings management will be explained 
by agency theory. To align with prospect theory that predict negative relationship between REM and 
AEM, the hypothesis is when a variable is a cost that decrease REM, this variable will increase AEM. 
Hereby the hypothesis of how several variables might be costs of AEM or REM.
 Audit quality is one of cost of AEM. Management has obligation to pay audit fee whereas 
audit quality can control AEM. One indicator of audit quality is audited by big-4 accounting firms 
which reflects the better audit than nonbig-4 accounting firms. There are mixed findings about the 
relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The positive and negative value is 
based on the different condition. However, agency theory predicts negative relationship. Audit has 
significant role to reduce AEM (Hermiyetti & Manik, 2012). The higher of audit quality has impact on 
the easier of auditor to detect AEM because auditors have higher possibility to discover the unusual 
accrual judgment. Auditors have to ensure that real transactions are properly recorded, but have no 
obligation in evaluating managers’ motivation in applying those real activities (Burnett et al., 2012). 
Aligned with prospect theory that states negative relationship between AEM and REM, AEM will be 
avoided because it can be detected by auditor, but REM is employed more (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). 
The hypothesis developed is as follow:
H2a:  Audit quality negatively affects accrual earnings management.
Financial health is a cost of AEM. The attainment of financial health demands on cost and 
this financial health further might benefit management. Banks with good financial health have wide 
opportunities to engage in real manipulation (Badertscher, 2011) and require nonprofit support 
through AEM. Otherwise, unhealthy banks need improvement in financial performance through 
AEM because those banks incapable to employ REM (Wasiuzzaman, 2018; Zang, 2012). This different 
impact of financial health on AEM and REM is in accordance with the negative relationship between 
AEM and REM as stated by prospect theory. Therefore, the hypothesis developed is as follow:
H2b: Financial health negatively affects accrual earnings management.
Market share is a cost of AEM. Management needs cost and efforts to increase market share 
which the market share provides more advantages. Banks that dominate the markets enjoy the 
competitive advantages due to their experiences, economic benefits, and better power on customers 
(Wasiuzzaman, 2018). These banks do not need to increase income through AEM (Zang, 2012) 
because the income target through real activities have been achieved . Otherwise, banks that 
encounter competitive pressure will have less competitive advantages. According to prospect theory 
which predict negative relationship between REM and AEM, banks with low market share will have 
high incentives to implement AEM because REM is difficult to implement (Joosten, 2012). The 
hypothesis developed is as follow:
H2c: Market share negatively affects accrual earnings management.
Institutional ownership is a cost that can limit REM as one kind of control mechanism. The 
institutional ownership becomes a cost because management needs costs to employ institutional 
investors to monitor decision making (Tanjung et al., 2015). Based on agency theory, institutional 
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investors are concern in monitoring real activities with the aim of focusing strategies that have 
consequences in the long term (Zang, 2012). It therefore, higher institutional ownership will limit 
management in employing REM. Management should avoid using real activities such as increasing 
income for short term target that will sacrifice long term purpose. Accordingly, the involvement of 
institutional investors will control REM which leads to lower REM and higher AEM (Zang, 2012). The 
impact of institutional ownership on REM and AEM is different as the negative relationship between 
REM and AEM by prospect theory. The hypothesis developed is as follow:
H3: Institutional ownership negatively affects real earnings management.
Methodology
This study focuses on Islamic Banks and excludes Islamic-window banks due to Islamic-window 
banks are only business units from parent conventional banks, which have operation based on Islamic 
principles. Islamic-window banks have different characteristics and obtain financial influences from 
conventional core business. Because this study focuses on Islamic banks, the population is 75 financial 
statements from 13 Islamic banks from 2013-2018. There were only 11 banks tested because the 2 
Islamic banks have just operated in last 5 years. The period of 2013-2018 is chosen based on the length 
of the operation years and data available for t, t-1, and t-2 required. The detail sampling procedures 
is shown on Table 1 in the results section.
Data used in this study is secondary data of annual reports collected from the website of the 
Islamic banks.  Annual financial statement is used due to an observation of REM and AEM to be 
more appropriate if they are examined on an annual basis. The use of AEM can be observed in the 
year end. 
AEM is measured by discretionary accrual referring to Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012) 
which is adjusted to Islamic banks’ account.  Discretionary accruals are the residual as the difference 
between actual accruals and the normal predicted. Residual value is generated from the regression 
as follows:
             (1)
Note:
Accrualsit /Ait-1  : Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus cash 
     flow from operation of bank i, in the year t, which are scaled with total assets 
     in the year t-1.
α 1 (1/Ait-1)  : Interception scaled with total assets of bank i, in the year t-1 thus operating 
     cash flow does not have value 0 when operating revenue and lag operating 
     revenue value are 0.
∆ORit/Ait-1  : Operating revenue of bank i, in the year t, minus operating revenue of bank 
     i in the year t-1, which are scaled with total assets in year t-1.
PPEit-1/Ait-1  : Plant, property, and equipment gross of bank i, in the year t-1, which are 
     scaled with total assets in the year t-1.
0   : constant.
it   : error term of bank i, in the year t
Real manipulation (REM) includes abnormal level of production costs and abnormal level of 
discretionary expenditures (Zang, 2012; Joosten, 2012). REM for conventional banks is measured 
referring to Surifah (2017) and Chou & Chan (2018) which consists of abnormal interest expense, 
abnormal discretionary expense, and abnormal cash flows.
REM for Islamic banks is a modification from REM of conventional banks based on the specific 
products and accounts of Islamic banks. One proxy of REM for Islamic banks is modification of 
abnormal production cost in manufacturing companies into abnormal revenue sharing distributed 
(Surifah, 2014). It is due to the cost of sales in banking institution is interest expense paid to depositors, 
which is revenue sharing distributed to depositors in Islamic banks. Therefore, REM measurement 
consists of 3 proxies, namely the abnormal cash flow of the operation activities, abnormal revenue 
sharing distributed, and abnormal discretionary expenses whereas the abnormal is the difference 
between actual and the normal cash flow of the operation activities, actual and normal revenue 
sharing distributed expenses or actual and normal discretionary expenses. The abnormal cash flow 
from operation (REM
CFO
), abnormal revenue sharing (REMRSD) and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(REMDE) are residual generated from the regression of 2, 3, and 4, respectively as follow:
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             (2)
             (3)
       (4)
Note:
CFOit/Ait-1    : Cash flows from operations of bank i, in the year t, which are 
       scaled with total assets in the year t-1.
1(1/Ait-1)    : Interception scaled with total assets of bank i, in the year t-1 
       thus operating cash flow does not have value 0 when operating 
       revenue and lag operating revenue value are 0.
ORit/Ait-1    : Operating revenue of bank i, in the year t, which are scaled 
       with total assets in the year t-1.
∆ORit/Ait-1    : Operating revenue of bank i, in the year t, minus operating 
       revenue of bank i in the year t-1, which are scaled with total 
       assets in year t-1.
(RSDit – Unpaid Rev Sharing)/Ait-1 : Revenue sharing distributed for an investor of an unrestricted 
       investment in income loss statement deducted by unpaid 
       revenue sharing of bank i, in the year t, which are scaled with 
       total assets in the year t-1.
∆ORit-1/Ait-1    : Operating revenue of bank i, in the year t-1, minus operating 
       revenue of bank i in the year t-2, which are scaled with total 
       assets in year t-1.
DEit/Ait-1    : Discretionary expenses of bank i, in the year t, which are 
       scaled with total assets in the year t-1.
ORit-1/Ait-1    : Operating revenue of bank i, in the year t-1, which are scaled 
       with total assets in year t-1.
0     : constant.
it     : error term of bank i, in the year t.
In the term of the actual value of revenue sharing distributed or discretionary expenses are lower 
than normal value, the abnormal revenue sharing distributed and abnormal discretionary expense 
will be negative. Negative abnormal cost indicates upward earning management. Therefore, estimated 
residuals from the estimation model of revenue sharing distributed and discretionary expenses are 
multiplied by -1, so that higher positive values of estimated residuals indicates the reduction of costs 
and higher upward earning management (Joosten, 2012).
After each REM measurement is calculated, then total REM will be counted, like Joosten (2012) 
stated that accumulated all the 3 REM proxies and Zang (2012) that added up REM of production 
cost and REM of discretionary expenses. This study will sum up those 3 proxies of REM, REM
CFO
, 
REMRSD, and REMDE to obtain the total REM. The total REM will represent the accumulation of real 
manipulation from cash flows, revenue sharing distributed, and discretionary expenses. For example, 
if the cash flows managed is upward, revenue sharing is managed upward, and discretionary expenses 
are pressed to support upward earnings. Therefore these 3 activities will support each other to upward 
the earnings.
Besides the measurement of REM and AEM, there are 4 explanatory variables; 3 costs that limit 
AEM, for instance audit quality, financial health, and market share; and 1 cost that limits REM such 
as institutional ownership. Audit quality is measured by whether banks are audited by the Big4 which 
is 1 if banks are audited by Big4 and 0 otherwise (Joosten, 2012). Financial health is measured by cash 
flow-to-total debts (Beaver, 1966). Market share is measured referring to Rettab et al. (2010) which is 
adjusted as banks’ revenue to the total revenue of its Islamic banking industry. Institutional ownership 
is measured by a percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of year t (Zang, 2012).
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There are some control variables including Return on Assets (ROA), size, and leverage that are 
generally used to control the different performance and size. Size is measured by log of total assets 
(Zang, 2012) and leverage is measured by total liabilities to total assets (Cohen et al., 2008).
A correlation test is conducted to test the hypothesis 1 about the relationship between REM 
and AEM. A regression test is done based on formula 5 and 6 to examine hypothesis 2a, 2b, 2c, and 
3 about the impact of relative costs on earnings management. Audit quality, financial health, and 
market share are costs of AEM whereas these variables can minimize the AEM, otherwise positively 
affect REM. Meanwhile, beginning institutional ownership is cost of REM which external control can 
minimize REM, but positively affects AEM. The regression estimations are as follow:
   (5)
   (6)
Dependent variable in formula 5 is REM which is sum of abnormal cash flow from operation 
(REM
CFO
), abnormal revenue sharing (REMRSD), and abnormal discretionary expenses (REMDE). It 
is due to REM is done through the combination of those 3 proxies. Actually, formula 5 and 6 are 
similar. This study test formula 5 and 6 as robustness to ensure the consistent results. For example, if 
audit quality has positive impact on REM (in formula 5), it should have negative impact on AEM (in 
formula 6). This study conducted correlation and regression tests using EViews 8.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Goodness of Fit
Initially, the number of financial statements of Islamic banks from 2013 to 2018 is amounted 
to 75 because there are 2 banks that have operated less than 6 years. After excluding banks with 
uncomplete data, there are 66 samples consisting of 11 banks in the period of 2013-2018. To fulfill the 
goodness of fit, there are 3 outliers excluded which are number 10, 51, and 60. Therefore, 63 samples 
are tested for correlation and regression. The number of samples is shown on Table 1.
The goodness of fit is shown on Table 2 below. The table compares the goodness of fit between 
before and after excluding outliers. Before excluding outliers by using 66 samples, the data still 
contains autocorrelation, non-normality, and heteroskedasticity. After excluding outliers by using 
63 samples, the data fulfills all criteria of goodness of fit for both AEM and REM equation. Durbin 
Watson scores show that there is no autocorrelation. Prob. Jarque-Bera scores which are more than 
0.05 mean the normality is fulfilled. Prob. Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey scores of more than 0.05 shows the 
homoskedasticity. Lastly, the data fulfills non-multicollinearity.
Descriptive Data
Descriptive data of earnings management and firms’ characteristics variables are shown on Table 3 
and Table 4. Based on Table 3, the positive mean value of REM
CFO
 amounted to 0.00031 indicates that 
Islamic banks tend to do upward REM through abnormal cash flow of the operation. In the other words, 
Islamic banks increase the earnings through generating more revenue from operating activities. The negative 
mean value of REMRSD amounted to -0.00041 indicates that Islamic banks tend to do downward REM or 
decrease earnings through revenue sharing distributed. Islamic banks smooth the revenue distribution to 
depositors (Hamdi & Zarai, 2013) by slightly increasing revenue sharing distribution to decrease earnings. 
This high revenue sharing distributed indicates that Islamic banks have concern to satisfy the depositors 
through revenue sharing distribution. The positive mean value of REMDE amounted to 0.00043 means there 
Table 1. Number of Samples Tested
Description Total
The number of financial statements from 2013-2018 (13 Islamic banks) 75
Banks with uncomplete data for 2011-2012 (2 Islamic banks) 9
The number of samples from 2013-2018 (6 years, 11 Islamic banks) 66
Outlier (data number 10, 51, 60) 3
The number of samples tested 63
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is a reduction of discretionary expenses. Discretionary expense is less than normal condition which results 
in upward earnings management. However, the mean of the total value of REM shows positive number. It 
means that generally Islamic banks do upward REM or increase earnings from real activities which shows 
that real activities can support the earnings.
Meanwhile, the negative mean value of AEM indicates that Islamic banks tend do downward AEM. 
It signifies that Islamic banks exclude the application of accruals to increase earnings. Accruals are difficult 
to manage that may be due to control mechanisms such as applying accounting principles consistently or 
determining accounting judgement carefully. The different mean values between REM (positive, upward 
earnings management) and AEM (negative, downward earnings management) are in accordance with the 
first finding that AEM substitutes REM. When REM is likely upward the earnings, then AEM is not used 
as it shows downward direction.
Table 2. Goodness of Fit
Before Excluding Outlier (n=66) After Excluding Outlier (n=63)
AEM Equation REM Equation AEM Equation REM Equation
Non-autocorrelation Test 
(Durbin-Watson)
1.699 1.735 1.890 1.921
Normality Test
(Prob. Jarque-Bera)
0.000 0.162 0.391 0.829
Homoskedasticity
(Prob. Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey)
0.008 0.000 0.107 0.063
Non-multicollinearity Test
VIF:
Audit Quality
Financial Health
Market Share
Institutional Ownership
ROA
Size
Leverage
1.453
1.180
5.210
1.196
1.340
5.746
1.363
1.453
1.180
5.210
1.196
1.340
5.746
1.363
1.470
1.141
5.456
1.195
1.258
5.962
1.383
1.470
1.141
5.456
1.195
1.258
5.962
1.383
Table 3. Descriptive Data of Earnings Management
Earnings 
Management N Min. Max. Mean
REM
CFO
63 -0.164 0.139 0.00031
REMRSD 63 -0.032 0.034 -0.00041
REMDE 63 -0.255 0.114 0.00043
REM 63 -0.218 0.279 0.00033
AEM 63 -0.158 0.176 -0.00041
Note: REM is real earnings management which is the sum of REM
CFO
, REMRSD, and REMDE. REMCFO, REMRSD, and 
REMDE are estimated residuals from the formula 2, 3, and 4, respectively. AEM is accrual earnings management which 
is estimated residuals from formula 1.
Table 4. Descriptive Data of Firm Characteristics
Variables N Min. Max. Mean
Audit Quality 63 0.000 1.000
Financial Health 63 -1.290 2.080 0.100
Market Share 63 0.010 0.380 0.096
Institutional Own. Beg. 63 0.770 1.000 0.978
ROA 63 -0.169 0.023 -0.003
Size 63 12.110 13.990 12.009
Leverage 63 0.060 0.320 0.167
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Table 4 presents the descriptive data of firm characteristics. More than a half of Islamic banks 
are audited by accounting firms that are affiliated with Big-4 which shows high audit quality. The 
positive mean value of financial health amounted to 0.100 indicates that most of the Islamic banks 
have more cash flow than total debts. It means that Islamic banks have cash surplus after particular 
portion for paying the debts. The mean value of the market share of 0.096 shows that average market 
share of each bank from the total of 11 Islamic banks is around 9%. The mean value of institutional 
ownership of 0.978 shows that almost all of Islamic banks are owned by the institutions, not owned 
by the individual. The majority shareholders of almost Islamic banks are the conventional parent 
company of the banks, except Bank Muamalat Indonesia.
The negative mean value of ROA amounted to -0.003 indicates that some Islamic banks generate 
a net loss in some financial period. The minimum value of the size of 12.110 and the maximum of 
13.990 show all banks have almost the same size in general. The bank that has the smallest size is Bank 
Victoria Syariah and the biggest one is Bank Syariah Mandiri. The mean value of leverage of 0.167 
means that total liabilities is about 16.7% of the total assets in average.
Correlation and Regression Test
Correlation between REM and AEM is presented on Table 5. Regression of relative costs on 
REM and AEM is shown on Table 6.
Based on Table 5, a probability of 0.011 indicates that REM
CFO
 is positively correlated with 
REMRSD, but the coefficient of 0.318 shows weak correlation. It means that REM is done through 
generating operation revenue more and reducing distributed revenue sharing beyond the normal 
activities simultaneously. REM
CFO
 and REMRSD are not correlated with REMDE which mean the 
Islamic banks exclude discretionary expenses in doing REM. It can be due to difficulties to reduce 
discretionary expenses in an abnormal way. REM
CFO
, REMRSD, and REMDE are positively correlated 
with total REM due to REM is a total amount of REM
CFO
, REMRSD, and REMDE. Therefore, REMCFO, 
REMRSD, and REMDE will be definitely correlated with REM. REMCFO has very strong correlation 
with REM as indicated by the coefficient of 0.892. It signifies that REM is mostly conducted through 
REM
CFO
 or abnormal cash flow from operations.
REM
CFO
 and REMRSD are negatively correlated with AEM. REMCFO is very strongly correlated 
with AEM as shown by the coefficient of -0.932, but REMRSD is weakly correlated with AEM as 
shown by the coefficient of -0.325. This result is consistent with the total REM that is also negatively 
correlated with AEM as shown by coefficient of -0.714. Meanwhile, REMDE is not correlated with 
AEM. It shows that discretionary expenses are not the factor affecting or being affected by AEM. 
This result is consistent with no correlation between REMDE and other REM proxies as explained in 
the previous paragraph whereas Islamic banks do not manipulate discretionary expenses in abnormal 
way. 
These findings are in accordance with Zang (2012), Joosten (2012), Badertscher (2011), Chung 
et al. (2012), Cohen et al. (2008) that REM negatively affects AEM. It confirms the hypothesis that 
the level of AEM will be raised based on the results of REM done through the financial period. The 
reason of manager chooses one or another is based on the order of earnings management can occur 
(Badertscher, 2011), as stated above that REM is conducted before AEM. This negative correlation 
is in accordance with prospect theory. When company face loss or negative earnings as the results 
of REM, it reflects that managers have no opportunity to manipulate earnings through real activities. 
Afterwards, managers will use discretion and judgment to manipulate earnings upward in order to 
Table 5. Correlation between Real Earnings Management (REM) and Accrual-based Earnings Management (AEM)
REM
CFO
REM
RSD
REM
DE
REM AEM
REM
CFO 0.318
0.011
0.198
0.120
0.892
0.000
-0.932
0.000
REMRSD 0.019
0.884
0.384
0.002
-0.325
0.009
REMDE 0.602
0.000
0.087
0.498
REM -0.714
0.000
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gain additional earnings through AEM and report has positive income (Subekti, 2012). Otherwise, 
managers will decrease the AEM if company can generate income as the results of REM.
As prospect theory states, the substitution between REM and AEM is performed to achieve 
target (Tang et al., 2016: Christiawan & Narsa, 2020). The income is not too high, but management 
is just likely to meet the specific target, such as above prior year’s earning, change from negative 
to positive income or smooth the income. Earnings that are below the target will increase upward, 
whereas earnings that are far above from the target could be reduced so that future threshold is 
possible to achieve (Pududu & Villiers, 2016). Smoothing earnings seems less risker than volatile 
earnings (Graham et al., 2005). Regardless, it is impossible for Islamic banks to detach themselves 
from this threshold mechanism and desire to attain profit target (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012).
The impact of costs on REM and AEM is shown on Table 6. Audit quality does not affect AEM 
and REM. Audited by Big-4 accounting firms still elicit AEM behavior of Islamic Banks. The finding 
is different with the previous studies that audit quality can constraint managers’ ability to do AEM 
(Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Burnett et al., 2012; Barton & Simko, 2002) as Big-4 accounting firms can 
provide better audit quality.
Financial health does not affect AEM and REM. This finding is inconsistent with previous findings 
that financial health positively affects REM. Healthy banks have good financial performance through 
real activities, while unhealthy banks fail to meet the operation target, and have lack opportunity to 
manipulate real activities so managers are predicted to concern on AEM using financial reporting 
(Zang, 2012). This finding indicates that financial health does not determine whether banks will 
engage in REM and AEM. Both healthy and less healthy banks can engage in REM and AEM 
without any particular pattern. 
Market share negatively affects AEM which confirms the hypothesis. Islamic banks which 
dominate the market as shown by the operating revenue will do less AEM because they have 
competitive advantages and economic benefits derived from customers (Zang, 2012). However, the 
result also shows that banks with higher market normally operate without manipulating earnings. The 
market share through normal real activities can be obtained by Islamic banks as shown by no impact 
of market share on REM.
Institutional ownership is found to have impact both on REM and AEM, but the result is 
in different direction with the hypothesis. The hypothesis states that institutional ownership should 
negatively affect REM because institutional investors are involved in long-term and strategic decision 
making so that will avoid real manipulation with short term target (Tanjung et al., 2015; Kazemian & 
Sanusi, 2015; Zang, 2012). However, the result shows institutional ownership pushes upward REM 
and decreases AEM. Institutions even encourage banks to maximize the operating revenue obtained 
from real activities or channeling the funds and manage the sharing distribution beyond the normal 
activities as the previous results.
Table 6. The Trade-Off between Real Earnings Management (REM) and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
(AEM)
Hypothesis Coefficient
REM 
Equation
(Prob.)
Hypothesis Coefficient
AEM 
Equation
(Prob.)
Costs of AEM
   Audit Quality + 0.022 0.427 - 0.004 0.869
   Financial Health + -0.027 0.278 - 0.039 0.061
   Market Share + 0.285 0.060 - -0.263 0.034
Cost of REM
   Institutional Own-
ership 
- 0.482 0.026 + -0.353 0.045
Control Variables
   ROA 0.952 0.019 0.644 0.051
   Size -0.044 0.009 0.031 0.024
   Leverage 0.430 0.043 -0.218 0.203
F-statistics
Adj. R2
H3
0.215
H2a, H2b, 
H2c, H2d 0.179
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Based on the explanation above, audit quality, and financial health are not cost that suppress 
AEM. Related to market share, the result confirms that market share can be a cost that limit 
management to employ AEM. However, the role of institutional ownership shows different direction 
with Zang (2012). The institutional ownership is a control mechanism to decrease agency conflict by 
monitoring the AEM, not by the REM as predicted.
ROA positively affects REM. It means that ROA affects managers’ incentives to apply REM 
with the aim to achieve the income target (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012). Size negatively affects REM and 
positively affects AEM. Size shows more capabilities (Alves et al., 2016), so that it will decrease REM. 
Meanwhile, leverage positively affects REM. Higher ratio of liabilities indicates higher debts or more 
funds collected from depositors which require more cost (Ahmed et al., 2018) to replenish the debts 
and distribute revenue sharing to depositors. It will push banks to do REM to cover the costs.
In general, the impact of banks’ characteristics on REM and AEM in Islamic banks is similar 
with conventional banks. Islamic banks with Islamic values also conduct earnings management to 
smooth earnings. The difference is Islamic banks do activities based on aqad permissible by sharia. 
Islamic banks derive and channel funds through Islamic transaction, and provide returns for depositors 
in the form of revenue sharing. The Islamic transaction also turns out to be a media to do earnings 
management.
CONCLUSION
There are 2 objective of this study which are: 1) to observe the relationship between REM and 
AEM based on prospect theory, and 2) to find which control mechanisms among governance and 
capital ability of the banks that can control REM or AEM based on agency theory. Islamic banks 
in Indonesia is found to do REM through generating operation revenue and reducing distributed 
revenue sharing beyond the normal activities and not managing discretionary expenses. REM is 
found negatively affecting AEM whereas Islamic banks do upward REM and downward AEM. If by 
doing REM have attained the income target, managers avoid employing the AEM as stated by the 
prospect theory.
Audit quality and financial health are not cost that decrease REM and AEM. Market share 
negatively affects AEM which shows that domination of the market indicates good performance 
through real activities that results in lower AEM. Institutional ownership is found to have impact 
both on REM and AEM, but contrary to the hypothesis. Institutional ownership encourages banks 
to maximize the operating revenue through upward REM, and it then decreases AEM. These results 
show that both market share and institutional ownership are mechanisms to control AEM referring 
to agency theory.
The outcome of this study can provide additional explanation related to the specific technique 
of earnings management occurring in Islamic Banks. Funders may gain the reliability of earnings 
whether the incentives of earnings management are strong or weak. For standard setters, the high 
AEM through accounting discretion might need a restriction. Banks’ financial statements with high 
accruals and large difference between cash flows and profit are indication of earnings management 
(Riwayati et al., 2015).
Limitation of the study is variable costs tested are based on the previous studies. This study tests 
variable costs from bank characteristics such as financial health, market share, and governance aspects 
such as audit quality and institutional ownership. Suggestion for further study is adding variable costs 
like other banks’ characteristics and governance, financial reporting practice related to standards 
used or capital market incentives in order to provide more comprehensive results. Besides, it needs 
to observe the pattern of earnings management based on specific conditions, not in an aggregate way. 
Different growth rate of bank or a change of economics climate and policy related to capital market 
or standards, may result in different findings. Further research may also compare the pattern between 
Islamic and conventional bank contexts to observe whether there is difference earnings management 
among them or among countries.
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